Abstract: We develop a model of a contest between two political candidates who may care about their reputations separately from how they affect the election outcome. In the game's first stage, each candidate chooses to maintain his maximum reputation or to shirk to lower it. In the second stage, candidates undertake positive or negative campaigns. We allow the magnitudes of reputational effects of positive and negative campaigns, and the relative importance candidates place on reputation and winning, to vary. Under many parameter values, candidates shirk in order to change the equilibrium strategies and outcome in the second stage of the game.
"Good government is good politics." Mayor Richard J. Daley
I. Introduction
Whether politicians shirk has been extensively studied as a type of principal-agent problem: the agent-politician has different interests from the principal-voters and acts in accordance with the voters' interests only if disciplined at the ballot box. One branch of that literature has studied whether term-limited politicians in their final term behave differently than when reelection is possible 1 . Even when reelection is possible, a representative may shirk to get large campaign contributions or direct transfers of wealth. 2 In these cases, good government remains good politics: a politician who shirks gives up political advantage for personal gain.
In this paper, we demonstrate an alternative possibility: political shirking, instead of being minimized by the electoral process, can be caused by strategic factors arising from that process even when politicians and voters have common preferences. To establish this, we develop a simple stylized model of a political contest between an incumbent and a challenger.
Candidates begin the contest with initial reputations that are then altered by campaign activities. Initial reputations could be based on many factors including policy positions, competence in governing, and personal attributes, some of which can be affected by the candidates, at least in a downward direction. The incumbent might intentionally choose a reputation below the maximum by being inefficient or by adopting unpopular policies. The challenging party might run a candidate whose reputation is lower than some other potential challenger's, since all the potential challengers will not start with the same reputations. In the first initial reputation stage, candidates may choose their initial reputations simultaneously or sequentially.
In the second campaign stage, candidates simultaneously choose whether to run positive or negative campaigns. A candidate raises his own reputation by running a positive campaign, and lowers the opponent's reputation by running a negative campaign. If both run negative campaigns, both lose reputation but by an amount that may be larger or smaller than the loss from running a positive campaign against the opponent's negative one. At the end of the 1 See Bender and Lott (1996) for a review of the political shirking literature. Later treatments of this topic include, among others, Schmidt et al (1996) , Figlio (2000) , Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) and Lawrence (2007) . 2 See Chappell (1981) and Bender (1991) .
campaign, the winner of the election is the candidate with the higher reputation. The winning candidate values the sum of her reputation and a bonus from winning. The loser values his postelection reputation.
Some assumptions about voter and candidate preferences are crucial to the analysis. We treat the electorate as a single representative voter. In effect, all voters view the candidates identically rather than having different preferences. One justification for this approach is that Downsian convergence has occurred, so that both candidates advocate the same policies. All voters would then prefer the candidate who is more competent.
Candidate preferences depend on reputation both because reputations affect the outcome of the contest and because candidates value reputation directly. 3 One pole would be politicians who follow the famous precept attributed to Vince Lombardi: "Winning isn't everything; it's the only thing." These candidates would care only about winning the election. The opposite pole would be "gentlemen politicians" who behave according to the Grantland Rice adage: "It's not that you won or lost, but how you played the game," and care only about reputation independent of the election's outcome. We consider how the equilibrium varies as different importance is given to these two factors when candidates are between the two poles. 4 For many parameter values, in the first stage, one candidate engages in a type of shirking by selecting an initial reputation lower than the maximum feasible value. Such strategic shirking occurs because having a lower reputation yields a more advantageous second stage equilibrium for the candidate. In particular, with a reduced initial reputation, a candidate is often less likely 3 Placing a value on reputation need not be altruistic. It might be for long-term gain, such as to increase future political or commercial success. This could take a number of forms. For example, Francis et al (1994) explore how politicians' past policy decisions affect their probability of achieving a higher elected office, while Parker (2003) considers whether reputational capital can limit shirking by politicians. 4 Varying the bonus to be larger or smaller than other reputational factors is formally equivalent to candidates valuing a weighted sum of those factors and the bonus and varying the weights. A substantial literature explores the impact of different objective functions for political candidates. Most of this literature has focused on the differences between maximizing expected vote share and maximizing the probability of winning. Aranson, Hinich and Ordeshook (1974) , Ledyard (1984) , Snyder (1989) , Duggan (2000) and Patty (2005) have considered the relation between outcomes under these two objectives. Politicians with policy preferences as well as preferences for the election outcome were considered by Wittman (1973) . The distinction between the utility a candidate would get from winning the election and other reputational factors has not been previously considered. Since all voters in our model are identical, maximizing vote share and probability of winning would be equivalent candidate objectives. Unlike the setting with policy preferences, voters and candidates have the same preferences for candidate reputations in our setting.
to be the target of a negative campaign by the opponent. Bad government, to some extent and in some circumstances, can be good politics.
A simple example illustrates this possibility. Consider an election between a challenger and an incumbent who start with equal reputations of 30. Before the actual campaign begins, the incumbent must vote either for or against some measure. Voting for it will raise the incumbent's reputation to 40 in the eyes of the voters while voting against it will lower the incumbent's reputation to 20. Both the voters and the incumbent himself prefer that he have the highest possible reputation, so it would seem straightforward that the incumbent would vote yes.
However, a campaign will take place after the incumbent's action on the measure and before the election. In the campaign, each candidate may run either a positive campaign or a negative campaign. A positive campaign raises the candidate's own reputation by 7. Negative campaigns are very effective, so a negative campaign lowers the opponent's reputation by 20 if the opponent runs a positive campaign. If both run negative campaigns, the voters are angered by the negative campaign war, and each candidate's reputation drops by 25. The candidate who wins the election gets a boost to reputation of 10.
What happens if the incumbent votes for, rather than against, the measure? Since the incumbent has the larger initial reputation, he loses the election only if he runs a positive campaign against the opponent's negative one, as this combination reduces his reputation by 13
and leaves the challenger's reputation unchanged. The payoff matrix for the campaign stage is then:
C
Even though the incumbent loses when he goes positive against the challenger's negative campaign, this is better for him than going negative, since the reputation loss of 25 from the campaign war is larger than the bonus from winning of 10. Thus, when starting with the higher reputation, the incumbent has a dominant strategy of going positive in the campaign game. The challenger goes negative and wins the election. The incumbent ends with a reputation of 27.
If instead, the incumbent voted against the measure and began the campaign stage with the reduced reputation, the incumbent would win only when going negative against the challenger's positive campaign. The campaign game payoff matrix is now the following:
In every box, the incumbent is worse off than when voting yes. However, it is the challenger now who has the dominant strategy of going positive. In equilibrium, the incumbent goes negative and wins the election, ending with a reputation of 30. The incumbent ends up gaining by voting against the preferences of the voters in the first stage.
This example is sufficient to show that strategic shirking can be politically beneficial. A more general analysis is needed to determine how typical is this behavior ---when does such shirking occur? Additionally, it will help us to understand why such shirking can be beneficial ---is it always so that in the campaign stage the shirker goes negative instead of positive and wins the election? The rest of the paper presents this general analysis.
Related literature is discussed in Section II. The model is described in Section III. Second stage equilibria for all possible parameter values are presented in Section IV, and first stage equilibria are derived in Section V. Extensions and conclusions are discussed in Section VI.
II. Related Literature
We are not the first to suggest the possibility of gains from actions that appear to be selfdestructive. In the game theory literature, it has been argued that players can gain by sacrificing resources or "burning money" (see, for example Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) and Van Damme (1989) ). In that literature, the self-sacrifice is a way for a player to signal what action will be taken in a later stage of the game, and is used as a method of equilibrium selection based on forward induction. Often, what matters is that burning money is possible, but this action is not chosen in equilibrium. In our model, the reduction in reputation is not done to select among multiple equilibria or to signal future actions. Instead, it alters the nature of the second stage equilibrium, which may well be unique.
In the political context, Hess and Orphanides (1995) In the industrial organization literature, a related thread shows that a firm or agent may gain by intentionally harming itself for one of two reasons: the action harms a rival more than it harms the initiator, or rivals are not directly harmed but are induced to take actions benefiting the initiator. Examples of the first, where self-sabotage ---analogous to shirking ---directly harms the rival, are Williamson (1968) and Sappington and Weisman (2005) . Williamson shows that a firm may increase its own costs by agreeing to a high-wage union contract that binds not only itself but also rivals that are harmed even more by the higher wages. Sappington-Weisman show that a vertically integrated producer supplying itself and rivals downstream may gain by reducing the quality of those inputs, if the competitors suffer a greater harm.
The second reason occurs in Gelman and Salop (1983) , in which an entrant can gain by limiting capacity if it then becomes so small that the incumbent does not seek to force it out of the market by undercutting its price. Shirking directly benefits the opponent, but is undertaken because it leads to a more advantageous outcome later in the game. In Bose, Pal, and Sappington (2008) , an agent intentionally increases total production costs while reducing marginal cost to induce the principal to offer a more attractive compensation scheme. In some situations, a Pareto improvement results from the agent's sabotage.
Our result is more akin to the second reason: shirking by a candidate with no other change may actually increase the opponent's probability of being elected. It is nevertheless undertaken because it brings about a new second stage equilibrium that is more advantageous to the shirker.
Our argument is somewhat more complex than in the literature discussed above, since shirking does not simply affect the opponent's actions, but induces a new equilibrium where both players may adjust their behavior. For example, there exist situations where the candidate entering the second stage with the higher reputation runs a positive campaign against the opponent's negative one and loses the election. By shirking, the situation is reversed, and the shirker now goes negative against an opponent's positive campaign and wins.
The interaction between first stage reputation and second stage negative campaigning is crucial to generating equilibrium shirking. The emphasis by pundits and campaign managers on the importance of negative campaigning in determining the outcomes of elections is consistent with its importance in our model. Surprisingly, there have been few formal models of negative campaigning. One model by Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) assumes that there are initially three types of voters: partisans of each candidate and undecided voters. Through positive campaigning, a candidate shifts initially undecided voters into supporters. By negative campaigning, a candidate shifts some opponent partisans into the undecided category. However, due to a boomerang effect, some of the candidate's own partisans become undecided. Harrington and Hess (1996) develop a model of negative campaigning in which voters evaluate candidates in terms of issue positions and personal traits. Voters differ in their preferences over the former, but agree in their evaluation of the latter. Campaigning affects voters' views only on the policy dimension. A candidate who runs positive ads is perceived to have issue positions more compatible with the preferences of swing voters while after running negative ads, the opponent's position is perceived to be further away from the preferences of swing voters. As in Skaperdas-Grofman, candidates maximize expected vote share and make a continuous decision between positive and negative campaigning. In both models there is a single type of equilibrium. One result in Harrington-Hess is that a candidate preferred on the personal dimension runs a relatively positive campaign, while the opponent runs a relatively negative one.
In some ways, our model is simpler than those discussed above. In our model, candidates differ only in reputation, which corresponds to the personal traits. We do not include a boomerang effect, have only a single representative voter rather than three types or a continuum, and assume that candidates make a discrete decision over a positive or negative campaign rather than a continuous one. 5 These simplifications allow us to add the complication that the effectiveness of a candidate's negative campaign can depend on whether the opponent chooses a positive or negative campaign. We also allow candidates to care about more than the electoral outcome. Finally, the above papers only have a single stage, which is equivalent to the second stage of our two-stage model. In our game, the initial reputation in the second stage is endogenous, where the factors analogous to reputation are exogenously determined in the papers discussed above. These additional complications mean that instead of there being only one type of equilibrium, as in Skaperdas-Grofman and Harrington-Hess, different types of equilibria exist at different parameter values in our model. This is crucial for the existence of strategic shirking.
III. The Model a. The Campaign Game
The game between an incumbent I and a challenger C takes place in two stages. 6 We treat reputation as a choice variable in the first stage. In actuality, these reputations are determined by other choices about policy or personal behavior. However, since we assume voters are identical in their preferences and the effect of these policies is through reputation, we can treat reputation as the choice variable without any loss.
7 For simplicity, we assume that G, L and D are independent of the candidates' initial reputations. More realistically, these parameters might differ between the incumbent or the challenger, or between the winner and loser of the race. However, adding these complications would not change the general nature of the results. We discuss the effects of some of these modifications in the conclusion section. 8 This is not the payoff matrix in the second stage since the bonus is not included in each box. Who wins varies with the specific parameter values. The relative effectiveness of negative and positive campaign ads has been the subject of significant debate. Authors including Lau (1982 Lau ( , 1985 , Basil, Schooler, and Reeves (1991) and Newhagen and Reeves (1991) have suggested that voters are more likely to remember negative information about political candidates than positive information. However, a review and meta-analysis performed by Lau et al (1999) suggests there is no strong evidence that negative ads are more effective than positive ones. 10 A "boomerang" effect, where a candidate running a negative campaign also loses reputation, would reinforce this. Candidates would then run negative campaigns only if L were significantly larger than G. Boomerang effects are discussed in Garramone (1984) and Merritt (1984) , and play an important role in the negative campaigning model of Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) . Assuming them here would complicate our analysis but not change the essential nature of the results. 11 The empirical evidence about meltdown is sparse and gives mixed results. Mayer (1996) quotes a Congressional Research Service report and several popular press articles that suggest negative campaign wars alienate voters, although Mayer himself defends the use of negative advertising. There has also been a debate about whether negative campaign wars decrease participation, which could be a signal that such wars cause voter apathy. This debate began with Ansolabehere and Iyengar's (1995) contention that negative campaigns depress participation, but several other authors have found that negative campaigns actually increase turnout. See Brooks (2006) for a discussion of this debate.
might begin negative attacks on the incumbent even before a specific individual is chosen to be the actual opposing candidate. The incumbent might have to wait until after the primary to know which individual to attack. On the other hand, if the primary is a relatively long time before the general election, attacking the incumbent so early might be counterproductive. In this case, the incumbent and challenger would be in a symmetric situation and would make their strategic decisions on the type of campaign to run simultaneously.
b. Election Outcome and Voter Preferences
When individuals decide for whom to vote, their only concern is the candidates' postcampaign reputations. Thus, in any of the boxes in the matrix in (1), the candidate with the higher reputation wins. If both candidates play the same strategy, so that either (P, P) 
c. Candidate Preferences
The goal of each candidate is to maximize his reputation. In addition to the post-campaign reputation, the winning candidate gets a boost to reputation denoted B. When the post-campaign reputations are the same, the candidates are equally likely to win. We assume risk neutrality so that, ex ante, each gets an expected boost of B/2. There are a number of reasons why candidates care about their reputations and not just winning. A winning candidate may be able to achieve more in office when starting with a higher reputation. A losing candidate may intend to run again for that or some other office in the future, and a higher reputation coming out of this campaign will affect success in future campaigns. In addition, prospects out of office for losing candidates or retiring incumbents may depend upon their reputations. Varying the size of B relative to the direct effects of campaign activities on reputation allows the candidates to have preferences that, in effect, vary between the polar cases of gentleman politicians and
Lombardians. The objective of maximizing reputation will approach that of being concerned only with winning if B is large relative to G, L, and D. If B is smaller than these, even approaching zero, then the gentleman politician polar case is approached.
Note that candidate and voter preferences have a large element of agreement in that both value candidate reputations. The candidates do not directly gain by reducing their own reputations as might occur in a principal-agent model, where reducing effort increases the agent's leisure. There might seem to be one aspect of disagreement in that the candidates also care about the bonus B from winning, which does not appear to enter voter preferences.
However, if the voters were assumed to care about the post-election reputation of the winner, this
would not alter their behavior. The bonus B would be a constant awarded to whomever they selected and would not affect their choice among the candidates.
d. Solution Concept
The game tree when the incumbent moves first in the initial stage and the candidates make their decisions simultaneously in the second stage is shown in Figure 1 . Given the sequential nature of the game, we consider the equilibria to be the subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In particular, when choosing initial reputations in the first stage, the candidates look ahead to how these will affect the outcomes in the second stage campaign. Hence, as is standard, we will solve the game backwards, first computing the second stage equilibria conditional on the initial reputations and then finding the equilibrium choice of initial reputations in the first stage.
Due to multiple second stage equilibria and discontinuities in first stage payoffs, we need several additional assumptions to specify the equilibria. First, when the multiple second stage equilibria are Pareto ranked so that both candidates agree on which is best, we assume that the Pareto preferred equilibrium is the one selected by the candidates. Second, when the multiple second stage equilibria are not Pareto ranked, we assume that the candidates have a common belief in the form of a probability distribution over the equilibria. Taking the expected value of the payoffs given this distribution specifies their expected payoffs in this situation. Third, due to discontinuities in the first stage payoffs found from backwards induction, when reputations are chosen sequentially in the first stage, a best reply may not exist for one of the candidates. When this happens, there is a choice for that candidate that gives her a payoff arbitrarily close to the supremum. In such cases, we assume that the outcomes are described by ε-equilibria.
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IV. Second Stage Equilibria
The equilibria That is, when negative campaigning is less effective than positive campaigning, positive campaigns strictly dominate. Not only will a candidate not choose a negative campaign as a pure strategy, but there will also be no mixed strategies with a positive probability of negative campaigning in equilibrium. A positive campaign directly raises a candidate's reputation, and also gives the candidate at least as good a chance of winning the election as a negative campaign. where a tie occurs, and finally, (7) L -G < X -Y with I winning in all cases. Regions (1), (3), (5), and (7) are interior regions in that in each of them X -Y can take a range of values. Regions (2), (4), and (6) are boundary regions in that in each of them X -Y must take a particular value.
The equilibria for ranges (5), (6), and (7) are not stated since I and C differ only in the values of their initial reputations. Since the game is otherwise symmetric, the equilibria in ranges (5), (6), and (7) are identical to those in ranges (3), (2), and (1), respectively, reversing the names of the candidates and their strategies. When mixed strategy equilibria exist, p and q denote the probabilities with which I and C respectively run positive campaigns.
Lemma 2 considers the case when a candidate's own reputation is higher when responding to an opponent's negative campaign with a negative rather than a positive campaign. (a) (P, P) is also an equilibrium in region (1) if G < B/2 (b) (P, P) is also an equilibrium in regions (1), (2), and (4), if B/2 < G < B, (c) (P, P) is also an equilibrium in regions (1), (2), (3), and (4) if B < G.
The payoffs for (P, P) in the different regions are the same as in Lemma 1 above. When both (P, P) and (N, N) are equilibria, there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium with payoffs for each player in between those for the pure strategy equilibria. When multiple equilibria exist, they are Pareto ranked, with both candidates preferring (P, P) to the mixed strategy equilibrium, which is preferred to (N, N). When the equilibria relate in this fashion, it is reasonable to assume that, when contemplating setting reputations so that X -Y would fall into a region with multiple equilibria, either candidate would assume that the Pareto optimal equilibrium (P, P) would be the one selected in the second stage.
The importance of winning relative to direct reputation (how B and B/2 compare to G) determines whether (N, N) is a unique equilibrium or whether (P, P) is also an equilibrium in regions (2), (3), and (4). The smaller is B relative to G (that is, the more gentlemanly are the politicians), the larger is the number of regions with multiple equilibria. When G is less than B, (N, N) is the unique equilibrium in the interior regions (3) and (5), and when G is less than B/2, it is also the unique equilibrium in boundary regions (2) and (4). Thus, when candidates have preferences near the Lombardian pole, both candidates go negative in the second stage equilibrium, except in regions (1) and (7). When candidate preferences are near the opposite pole, the candidates always choose positive campaigns in the second stage equilibrium.
Finally, in Lemma 3 we consider the case where negative campaigning is relatively effective but the harm from meltdown is sufficiently large that, when the opponent goes negative, a positive campaign in response gives the candidate a higher reputation than does a negative one.
Lemma 3: When D > L -G > 0, the equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the seven regions are:
(1) (P, P) with U I = X + G and U C = Y + G + B
(2) (a) If G > B/2, (P, P) with U I = X + G and are the same as those in Lemma 2, and so can be Pareto ranked, with the (P, P) equilibrium preferred. In 4(c), however, the equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. The candidates have opposite rankings, with I preferring (N, P) to (P, N) and C preferring the reverse, and both ranking the mixed strategy equilibrium in between. Since X = Y in this subcase and the mixed strategy equilibrium is symmetric, the candidates receive the same expected payoff in it. Overall, the expected payoffs across the three equilibria, given the common beliefs of the candidates, lie in a range between their values when (N, P) and (P, N) are the equilibria. Parameter values exist making the mixed strategy payoff near the upper and lower end of the range. Because of this, the expected payoffs of the candidates could be selected independently of each other.
In the other subcases, there is a unique equilibrium, which can either be in pure strategies or in mixed strategies. In subcases 2(c) and 3(b) the unique equilibrium is in mixed strategies; note that in both of these subcases, B can be relatively large (and thus the candidates can be near the Lombardian pole). In these mixed strategy equilibria, both candidates run negative ads with some probability greater than zero. Depending on the specific parameter values in each subcase, the probability of a candidate running a negative campaign can be anywhere between 0 and 1 and either candidate could have the higher probability of going negative.
Among the unique pure strategy equilibria, only in 4(d) ---which again has B large ---do both candidates choose negative campaigns. (P, P) is the unique pure strategy equilibrium either when B is small (subcases 2(a), 3(c) and 4(a) and the symmetric subcases 6(a) and 5(c)), or when the difference between X and Y is large (regions (1) and (7)). The candidates will both choose positive campaigns when other reputational effects are very important relative to the bonus from winning, or when one candidate has a large reputational advantage at the beginning of the second stage. When B has intermediate values, in the cases with pure strategy equilibria (subcases 2(b) and 3(a)), one candidate will choose a negative campaign and the other will choose a positive campaign in equilibrium.
Based upon the parameter restrictions in the three lemmas, six qualitatively different scenarios exist which are mutually exclusive and which exhaust the parameter space. scenario are written as bounds on G, the reputation gain from running a positive ad. G has a key role in specifying these conditions because a candidate is always able to take an action that gains 13 That there are not more scenarios follows from a number of reasons. One is that subcases in one region may not occur with subcases in another region. For example, in Lemma 3, subcase 3(a) is not consistent with 2(c), 4(b), or 4(d). Another is that some of the subcases differ in their full sets of Nash equilibria but after equilibrium selection such as taking the Pareto preferred equilibria, they are identical. This is true for subcases 4(a) and 4(b) of Lemma 3. Either negative campaigning is ineffective or the candidates value reputation more than winning. This scenario includes the polar case of gentlemen politicians. As shown in Figure 3 , each candidate's utility is strictly increasing in the candidate's reputation.
( Negative campaigning is effective, neither form of meltdown is either implied or ruled out, and the candidates strongly value winning. The Lombardian pole is included in this scenario.
As shown in Figure 8 In scenario (i), utilities are strictly increasing in reputation. In the other five scenarios, they are discontinuous, globally nonmonotonic, and are not quasiconcave. Utilities within a single interior region rise monotonically with reputation, but can have a discontinuous drop when moving from one region to the next due to differences in the second stage equilibria in different regions. As seen in the next section, these properties create the possibility that candidates can benefit by reducing their own reputations in the first stage; that is, they can benefit from shirking.
V. First Stage Equilibria
Since the game is symmetric between the candidates except for differences in X U and Y U and between X L and Y L , only cases where X U -Y U > 0 will be considered 14 . For X U -Y U < 0, the outcomes are the same as for X U -Y U > 0 with I and C reversed. This means that any equilibrium given for C moving first can also be interpreted as the equilibrium when the incumbent moves first but has a lower reputation than the challenger.
In the appendices, the formal specifications of the equilibria for each scenario are stated in six theorems and their proofs. In the text, we present a series of propositions giving the intuition behind these results. First, Propositions 1 and 2 give conditions under which neither candidate shirks. Proposition 2 combines results in Theorem 2A, Theorem 3A, Theorem 4A(i), B(i), and C(i),
and Theorem 6A, which concern scenarios (ii), (iii), (iv), and (vi), respectively. It also includes results from scenario (v), which we do not formally state. In scenario (ii), the challenger's utility is strictly increasing in Y when Y is below X, so the challenger would never gain by lowering reputation. The incumbent's utility in region (5) is always less than its value in region (4) with X = Y, so the incumbent always desires to reduce reputation until it equals that of the challenger.
The no-shirking outcome occurs when X L is above Y U , so that the incumbent is unable to reduce his reputation enough to equal the challenger's.
In scenario (vi), the incumbent would never gain from shirking, but the challenger might if
In scenario (iii), similar restrictions must be placed on the maximum and minimum values of the initial reputations of both candidates.
In scenario (iv), the conditions to rule out shirking depend on the timing of moves in the first stage. When the challenger selects reputation first or the candidates select simultaneously, the outcome is the same as in scenario (ii). However, when the incumbent moves first, determining whether there is a gain from shirking requires considering the potential response by the challenger. The incumbent would like to reduce X below Y U but then the challenger would respond by reducing Y below X, which could leave the incumbent worse off than initially. The incumbent will not shirk if the possible reductions in reputation are too small to yield a benefit (X L is not low enough) or if they allow for a harmful countermove by the challenger.
When the conditions of these two Propositions do not hold, different types of equilibria with shirking exist. One of these, given in Proposition 3, is a type of coordination game equilibrium.
Proposition 3: Assume that the following conditions all hold: A. the difference in the maximum initial reputations of the candidates is less than L -G; B. negative campaigning is more effective than positive campaigning; C. the candidates' preferences are strictly between the Lombardian and the gentleman politician poles. Specifically, the bonus from winning is greater than G, but less than the smaller of 2G and G -L + D; D. the incumbent can reduce his initial reputation to levels at or below the challenger's maximum initial reputation, and would gain by so doing; E. if the incumbent moves first, the challenger either does not desire to reduce his
reputation or cannot reduce it sufficiently to achieve a gain.
Then there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the candidates select the same initial reputations in the first stage with at least the incumbent shirking, regardless of the timing of selection of initial reputations. Both candidates run positive campaigns in the second stage, and have equal chances of winning the election. If they select sequentially, this equilibrium is unique, with both selecting an initial reputation equal to the challenger's maximum. If they select simultaneously, multiple equilibria exist, including multiple coordination equilibria with equal initial reputations in a range whose upper bound is the challenger's maximum reputation.
This Proposition covers scenarios (ii) and (iii), as given in Theorems 2 and 3B, and scenario (v), which is not formally stated. In these equilibria, the candidates are better off having the same reputations than for either to have a small reputational advantage. In scenarios (ii) and (iii), when their reputations are the same, the candidates both run positive campaigns and have equal chances of winning the election. In scenario (ii), when the reputations differ slightly the disadvantaged candidate runs a negative campaign against the opponent's positive one, and although he always wins the election (instead of winning only half the time) the direct reputation loss from not getting G with a positive campaign exceeds the gain of ½ B. In scenario (iii), both candidates use mixed strategies when their reputations differ slightly, and the expected payoffs can be less than when their reputations are the same. Finally, scenario (v) is more complex, given the multiple equilibria when reputations are equal. If both candidates believe that the mixed strategy equilibrium is highly likely and this gives both a high payoff, this coordination game equilibrium can occur.
When reputations are chosen sequentially, both players choose a reputation of Y U , so that the incumbent shirks but the challenger does not. In scenario (ii), selecting Y U is a dominant strategy for the challenger. The only requirement this equilibrium, then, is that the incumbent is able to reduce reputation to Y U and desires to do so. In scenarios (iii) and (v), additional conditions are needed to ensure that the challenger does not gain from shirking in response.
When the candidates select their initial reputations simultaneously, multiple equilibria exist.
In all but the boundary case where X = Y = Y U , both candidates shirk. All of these coordination equilibria are strict, but the one where they each choose reputations of Y U is the Pareto superior equilibrium among them. If the Pareto preferred selection criterion were imposed here, then just as under sequential choice of initial reputation, only that equilibrium would be assumed to occur.
Such sequential choice could be viewed as one way in which the equilibrium selection is achieved since each candidate would be willing to let the other select a reputation first.
A second type of equilibrium has only the challenger shirking. The conditions for this are given in Proposition 4. This proposition encompasses scenarios (iii) and (vi), given in Theorems 3C and 6B, and results from scenario (v). In all three of these scenarios, there are ranges of challenger reputations above X U + G -L such that the challenger would benefit from reducing reputation to either X U + G -L or to X U + G -L -ε when the incumbent's reputation is fixed at X It is interesting to note that the challenger shirks even though this never increases his probability of winning the election in the second stage, and may strictly reduce it. If neither candidate shirks, the second stage equilibrium is either in mixed strategies, so that each would have some chance of winning the election, or both undertake negative campaigns and the incumbent always wins. 16 After the challenger shirks, both run positive campaigns and the challenger always loses. A non-pure Lombardian would prefer this outcome, since reputation is important independent of the outcome of the election.
At first glance this seems puzzling, since scenario (vi), whose equilibria are treated in Propositions 2 and 3, contains the Lombardian pole, where the candidates care only about winning. The only two equilibria in this scenario are no shirking and having the challenger shirk to move the second stage game to region (6). In the latter equilibrium, the challenger always loses the election after shirking, but wins with some probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium of region (5). However, as B gets large and winning becomes very important, the probability of the challenger winning in the mixed strategy equilibrium goes to zero, apparently at a faster rate than G/B. If reputation has any weight, however small, the challenger prefers to avoid being the target of negative attacks.
In the previous four Propositions, the equilibria are essentially independent of the order of moves in the first stage. In the equilibria given in Proposition 5, the first mover shirks and the second mover does not, regardless of which candidate moves first.
Proposition 5: Assume that all of the following hold:
A. negative campaigning is more effective than positive campaigning;
B. the difference between the maximum initial reputations of the candidates is less than either L -G or G; C. the candidates' preferences are strictly between the Lombardian and the gentleman politician poles. Specifically, G -L + D > B > 2G; D. both candidates can reduce their initial reputations to levels at or below their opponent's maximum initial reputation less L -G.
Then the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is for the first mover to choose a reputation ε below his opponent's maximal reputation less L -G. Both candidates run positive campaigns in the second stage, and the first mover always loses.
This proposition includes scenario (iv), as given in Theorem 4A(iii) and 4B(iv) 17 . The results are based on who is the first mover rather than whether a candidate is an incumbent or a challenger. If the candidates moved simultaneously and had sufficient downward flexibility in their choice of reputation, a pure strategy equilibrium would not exist due to the desire of each to undercut the other.
18
In scenario (iv), the first mover shirks sufficiently to move the equilibrium to regions (1) or (7), at which point the second mover no longer wants to undercut and thus does not shirk. The equilibrium is now (P, P), with the first mover losing, but avoiding a loss in reputation from the There exists a mirror image of the equilibrium in Proposition 5, where instead of the first mover, it is the second mover who shirks to the opponent's maximum reputation less L -G. The conditions for this are given in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6: Assume that all of the following hold: A. negative campaigning is more effective than positive campaigning, and voters are angered by a negative campaign war, so that D > L;
17 A similar equilibrium exists in scenario (v) but the exact parameter restrictions for it are complicated to state.
18 Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Reny (1999) give sufficient conditions for the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in games with discontinuous strategy spaces, as occurs in our first stage. Even if a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, the candidates would be placing positive probability on reputations below their maximums, and hence would be shirking with positive probability.
B. the difference between the candidates' maximum initial reputations is less than L -G;
C This equilibrium can only occur in scenario (v); the conditions for it are presented in Theorem 5. The equilibrium here has some similarity to that in Proposition 4, where the challenger shirked to X U + G -L and the incumbent did not shirk. The difference is that the equilibrium from Proposition 4 did not depend on the order of moves, whereas in this equilibrium the challenger only shirks when moving second. In addition, this is the only case in which an incumbent moving second chooses to reduce his reputation below that of the challenger by more than an arbitrarily small ε.
The second mover runs a negative campaign after shirking, and wins the election half the time. If not shirking, there would be a mixed strategy equilibrium in the second stage, under which the expected payoff could be lower than the payoff when each candidate chooses a reputation of his opponent's maximum plus G -L. The shirking candidate may even have a lower probability of winning, but avoids the loss of reputation in the meltdown situation that occurs when both run negative campaigns.
The intuition in the cases where the incumbent moves first is straightforward: the discontinuous reduction in the challenger's payoff when Y = X U + G -L can make it beneficial for the challenger to shirk to that level. The incumbent can benefit from such shirking by the challenger, so does not shirk when moving first. The incumbent, when moving second, would choose a reputation of Y U + G -L not only because there is a discontinuity in his utility at that value, but also because it is worse for him to set his reputation at any of the intervening values, including Y U . In scenario (v), the payoff to the incumbent when X = Y can be low, depending on the beliefs the players have about the probabilities of different second stage equilibria arising, satisfying this requirement.
In the final equilibrium type, as given in Proposition 7, only the first mover shirks, but to a different level than in Proposition 5. This Proposition is from scenario (iv), as given in Theorems 4A(ii) and 4B(ii). The crucial feature of the first stage preferences is that when the reputations are in regions (3) to (5), each candidate would prefer to have a reputation slightly below that of the opponent. When moving first, each candidate must be concerned about whether the opponent moving second will be able to undercut and end up with the lower reputation. The first mover may have to shirk enough so that the opponent cannot also shirk and end up with the lower reputation. Thus, shirking is done to affect the opponent's first stage action and not just the second stage equilibrium. When the incumbent moves first, shirking to Y L -ε leaves the challenger unable to undercut and successfully changes the second stage outcome to (N, P) from (P, N). The other parameter restrictions in this case guarantee that this is the incumbent's best achievable outcome. When the challenger moves first, shirking to X L -ε prevents the incumbent from being able to respond, thus ensuring that the equilibrium remains (P, N).
If the second mover's minimal reputation is below that of the first mover, then the first mover cannot block the first mover from undercutting his reputation, and thus does not shirk at all. When the incumbent is the first mover, the challenger's best response is to remain at a reputation of Y U , yielding the no shirking outcome of Proposition 2. When the challenger moves first and cannot block the incumbent from undercutting his reputation, the incumbent responds by shirking to Y U -ε. The conditions for this to occur are given in Theorem 4B(iii).
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a model of political behavior that includes three important elements. First, candidates seek to maximize their political reputations, which depend both on winning the election and on how they campaign and govern. Second, prior to the start of the election campaign, the candidates choose an initial reputation. The incumbent does this in part by governing well or poorly and the non-incumbent party by selecting a candidate to run against the incumbent. By governing poorly or by choosing an individual who does not have the highest reputation, the candidate or party has engaged in a type of political shirking. Third, candidates choose between positive campaigning to raise the candidate's own reputation and negative campaigning to lower that of the opponent. When both run negative campaigns, the reputations are reduced by a different amount than if just one candidate goes negative.
Our main conclusion is that shirking can be equilibrium behavior for one of the candidates. This is done not to give the candidate a private benefit at a political cost but for political gain.
Having a lower initial reputation can lead to a more favorable equilibrium in the campaign stage where the candidates decide on going negative or positive. The changes in the second stage can be of different types. One possibility is that when neither candidate shirks, at least one of the candidates engages in negative campaigning with some probability, but after one shirks both go positive. A second possibility is that the candidate who shirks runs a negative campaign against the opponent's positive one whereas, if neither had shirked, with some probability that candidate would have run a positive campaign and the opponent a negative one.
In addition, we also derive specific results on the nature of such shirking and how it varies with the model's parameters. One important result is that strategic shirking only occurs when the maximum possible reputations of the two candidates are not very different. This type of shirking, then, is complementary to the more standard shirking done for direct private gain. That would tend to occur when the maximal reputations differ significantly, with the higher reputation candidate so heavily favored that giving up some advantage would incur little political cost.
Combining the two possibilities indicates that shirking may occur, albeit for different reasons, no matter how large or small is the difference between the maximum reputations of the candidates.
Another insight is that there is no single pattern of which candidate shirks. It could be a leader (the candidate selecting first if they choose initial reputations sequentially) or a follower (the candidate selecting reputation second or either candidate if they choose simultaneously). A follower shirks only to get a direct benefit, holding fixed the opponent's choice. A first mover may also shirk to make it undesirable for the second mover to shirk. In some cases, shirking by the first mover would induce the second mover to shirk, but this is never beneficial to the first mover so is never done in equilibrium. Hence, at most one of the candidates engages in shirking.
Furthermore, the candidate who shirks could be either the incumbent or the challenger. When the incumbent shirks, he could choose a reputation equal to that of the challenger or could select a reputation either slightly or significantly below that of his opponent. Entering the election campaign from behind sometimes can be advantageous. Shirking sometimes increases the shirker's chance of winning. In one case, the candidate with the lower reputation goes negative against a positive campaign by the other candidate and wins the election. Shirking by the incumbent that changes the ranking of their reputations increases his probability of winning from zero to one. In other situations, shirking lowers the probability of the shirker winning, but raises his post-election reputation by inducing a new second stage equilibrium where either his opponent is less negative or he is more positive.
To derive these results, we made a number of highly stylized assumptions. While the full implications of relaxing these assumptions are worth exploring, shirking is likely to continue to exist. It arises due to the non-monotonicities and discontinuities in the first-stage payoff functions, and these properties will continue to hold even when the assumptions are generalized.
One assumption is that the candidates are identical except for their feasible reputation sets. It would be reasonable to assume that they have different preferences over winning versus direct reputation effects. For example, an incumbent has previously received a winning bonus that was already incorporated into his initial reputation. A second winning bonus might be smaller than Second, we assume that the effects of positive and negative campaigns are independent of the candidates' initial reputations. It would be reasonable to assume that positive campaigns might be less effective and negative campaigns more effective at lower initial reputations. This would tend to reduce the benefits to shirking. However, given that the non-monotonicities in first stage payoffs arise due to discontinuous jumps in such payoffs, shirking would not be eliminated by this change in assumptions. When a small drop in reputation yields a large gain in payoff, changes in G or L due to the reputation change would be second order. However, some of the cases where a large drop in reputation is needed for shirking to benefit a candidate might no longer arise.
Second, we assume a very discontinuous electoral game. The candidate with the higher postcampaign reputation wins the election with certainty no matter how small the reputational advantage. This is analogous to deterministic voting. An alternative, analogous to probabilistic voting, would have the winner random with the probability of winning increasing in the difference between their reputations. This would tend to eliminate the discontinuities in the first stage utility functions but would not necessarily remove the non-monotonicities, so would not eliminate the benefits to shirking. The results would depend on the specific properties of the function specifying the election outcome as a function of the reputational difference.
Third, we assume reputation can vary continuously in the first stage of the game. In actuality, it might be discrete, especially for a challenger party selecting a specific candidate from a small set of contenders. Even an incumbent's reputation can be determined by discrete acts such as voting against a bill. Having discrete feasible reputation sets could alter the nature of the results but would not eliminate shirking. For example, coordination game equilibria in which candidates choose identical reputations might become less likely or even be eliminated, as they could not be achieved. Instead, the undercutting equilibria, in which one candidate gains by choosing a reputation slightly below that of the opponent, would be more likely to occur.
Finally, alternative assumptions about the campaign stage should be explored. Candidates might make sequential rather than simultaneous choices in that stage, and the timing could either be exogenously given or endogenously determined. This would tend to eliminate mixed strategy equilibria in this stage. Since shirking can occur under simultaneous choices in the second stage when only pure strategies are used, the same equilibria would arise under sequential decisions.
In addition, the choice of going negative could be made continuous instead of discrete. This would require specifying the nature of meltdown in this context. When are both campaigns sufficiently negative so that voters become angry or apathetic? Under reasonable specifications for this, it seems likely that shirking would still arise in some situations. 
This graph shows utility levels when this scenario arises under Lemma 3. A qualitatively identical figure would be generated by Lemma 2, with the values of the utilities being different but the relations among them being the same.
. . 
Note: the multiple dots at region (4) do not indicate the existence of multiple equilibria. Rather, the value of the candidates' utilities at this point is ambiguous. This turns out to be inconsequential for the results.
Additionally, this graph shows the utilities from Lemma 3. A qualitatively identical figure would be generated by Lemma 2, with the values of the utilities being different but the relations among them being the same, but for the value at regions (2) and (6). In Lemma 2, the value in region (2) closes region (3) and the value in region 6 closes region (5). This does not affect the results in Theorem 6.
. the second stage equilibrium is in region (7) with U I = X U + G + B. For any X < X U , U I is reduced whether the equilibrium remains in region (7) or the region shifts. When I selects X U , the best reply for C in region (7) Specifying the equilibrium in scenario (iii), which is shown in Figure 5 , involves defining three critical values denoted X*, Y*, and Y'. First, given the challenger's reputation, X* is the critical value of the incumbent's reputation such that for X U above X* the incumbent is better at X U than at any lower reputation, while for X U below X* the incumbent gains by selecting a lower initial reputation. To determine this value, note that U I decreases discontinuously as X increases from equaling Y to equaling Y + ε, and then increases linearly for X below Y + L -G. 
Appendix: Theorems and Proofs
(N, P) is the second stage equilibrium.
iii. ii. When the conditions of (A) do not hold and C acts as a follower, C will move to X U + G -L -ε when X is at X U . When C is a leader, it will do the same knowing that I has a dominant strategy of choosing X U . When I moves first, by lowering X sufficiently, it could create a situation in which C is no longer willing or able to gain by shirking. However, this would make I worse off since C's shirking to X + G -L -ε benefits I. Hence, under the conditions of (B), regardless of timing, I does not shirk and C reduces Y to X U + G -L -ε. Q. E. D.
